From: Sinclair Hart (slobak@bcn.net)
Date: Wed May 26 1999 - 17:30:29 PDT
Again, a fascinating history. May I ask how you come by such knowledge? Professor? History buff? Walter Felscher wrote: > > Reading through accumulated mail, I noticed with interest Tim > Merry's contribution from April 11th in which he replied to a > question from "Jessie" > > > Do you think the (a-) bomb would have been made > > if Japan had offered a conditional surrender? > > To this I want to add a small comment. > > Jessie wrote "have been made". Had she written instead "have been > thrown", then such question could be discussed from various > points of view. But if Jessie actually meant what she wrote, > namely "made" , then she started from the assumption that the > a-bombs were made in order to be applied against Japan. But this > assumption simply ignores the facts. The a-bombs were made in > order to be applied against Germany. This began after Germany had > declared war against the US in 1941 ; the development took years. > On May 8th 1945 the war ended with the utter defeat of Germany, > and at that point of time the bombs simply were not ready yet to > be applied. Three months later, they were. > > In winter 38/39 two German chemistry professors, Otto Hahn and > Fritz Strassmann, performed a laboratory experiment in which an > atomic kernel of uranium was split into two kernels of lighter > elements. Half a year later they published the results of the > experiment in an international journal. Thus these results could > be understood by the knowledgable scientists in this field. The > fission, or splitting, of atoms (in a size far below that of > micrograms) produced tiny, but measurable amounts of heat. It was > clear to those scientists that, IF IT COULD BE MADE POSSIBLE to > perform the experiment on a much larger scale with two pounds, > say, of uranium than much, much more heat would be produced. > IF this production of heat could be made to happen slowly, > something of what we now call an atomic power plant might be > obtained. IF this production of heat could be made to happen > within a moment then the heat set free would amount to the > explosion of a huge ammunitions depot. > > There were several very large IFs in these outlooks which to Hahn > and Strassmann seemed to involve unsurmountable technical > difficulties, placing them beyond realizability. Clearly, without > that appreciation they would not have published results which > might lead to blowing up the world. And then the outbreak of the > war in September '39 led to the closure of international scientific > communications. From now on, no side knew whether the other side > had taken up pursuing this matter. > > On the German side, the army staff's arms development section > became aware of the theoretical possibilities of atomic fission. > But the scientists' scepticism to surmount the technical > difficulties was so large that funds and manpower were engaged > on a very small scale only. When the allied forces occupied > Germany in 1945, it soon became clear that the German research, > was years behind the American and that no technological > realization had even been attempted. Twenty miles south from the > place where I write, you still can inspect, at a special small > museum in Haigerloch, what little the German scientists had > achieved. In so far, Mr. Merry's statement "The Germans were > well on the way to developing the bomb" is mistaken. > > The German failure to progress was, in all likelihood, due to the > fact that the project was staffed by theoretical scientists, > interested in fundamental research, but not experienced in the > development of technologies: there was no driving force. Also, > the political leadership (Hitler, Speer) was essentially unaware > of the possibilities the project would have offered. Given what we > know about Hitler's state of mind, we may well assume that, had > an a-bomb been available to him in the later stage of the war, he > would have used it - even if only to act out the Niebelungen's > demise on an even grander scale as that he actually performed in > in April '45 . > > [ You may compare this with the most successful development of > rocketry under the guidance of the engineer von Braun. He > succeeded to persuade the German army that funds and, for the > technical realization, considerable manpower was required; an > army general was delegated to provide all support for von Braun's > group, and in the end even forced labour was employed for the > rocket's production. ] > > On the American side, the potential danger of Germany developing > an a-bomb was realized by the phycicist Albert Einstein, himself > Jewish and aware of the large scale (already at pre-Shoa times) > persecution of Jews in Germany and German-occupied territories. > Being the most reknowned phycicist of the century, he could > afford to write a letter to president Roosevelt and expect it to > be read; he pointed out the danger and suggested the only > countermeasure there was: to develop an a-bomb oneself. Supported > by his science advisors, Roosevelt established the Manhattan > project which, employing a multiple of the scientists in the > German group, overcame first the theoretical problems and then, > with a workforce of thousands, the practical problems of the > technical realization of an a-bomb. Given what we know about the > allied bomber command's and its political leadership's state of > mind, we may well assume that, had an a-bomb been available to > them before the German collapse, they would have used it. > > W.F.